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Article 5

RECENT

CASE NOTES

is in the same state in which decedent was domiciled are not applicable as
there is no question of extraterritorial application of the state statute. The
conflict arises when property held in trust and the decedent are in different
states. The state of decedent's domicile has no jurisdiction over the property
itself. If A dies in Indiana leaving tangible personalty located in Ohio and
Illinois, clearly Indiana does not have the power to tax the transfer of the
property because it is without the jurisdiction of She state. Yet A, if he had
so desired during his lifetime, did not need to revoke any sort of instrument
to bring that property into the state of his domicile. But, this power, while
unexercised, did not detract from the taxing power of the state where the
property was located, or permit taxation by the domiciliary state. 19 It would
seem therefore that the power of disposition by a resident of a state should
give that state no authority to tax intangible property held in trust in another
jurisdiction.
In the principal cases the securities have been localized in the states where
the trusts were created, Alabama and Colorado. The settlor of the Alabama
trust had no power of revocation since 1917, and the settlor of the Colorado
trust never exercised her right of revocation. The exercise of any right or
power reserved by the settlor was dependent on the laws of the state of the
residence of the trustee and not upon or subject to the laws of the settlor's
domicile. As Mr. Chief Justice Hughes says, "The fundamental question is
thus not one of a reserved but unexercised power of revocation or of ultimate
control in an owner, but whether securities, classed as intangibles, are necessarily and in all circumstances subject to a different rule from that obtaining
in the case of tangible property. It is not perceived that there is a sound basis
for such an invariable distinction, which is foreign to common thought and
practical needs." 20
The Supreme Court long ago when considering the
question in regard to tangible property did not hesitate to limit the application
of the fiction mobilia sequunfur personam.2 1 If the court continues the view
of the principal cases, multiple taxation can be avoided only by establishing
the trust in the state of the domicile of the settlor, or as has been suggested
by a recent writer, 2 2 by reciprocity between the states.
F. J. N.
TAXATION OF JUDGES' SALARIES-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-Justice Woodrough
took office as Judge of the Eighth United States Circuit Court May 1, 1933.
The Federal Revenue Act of 1932 provided for the taxation of incomes
including the compensation of judges of courts of the United States taking
office after June 6, 1932.1
This provision was included in subsequent
Revenue Acts of 1934 and 1936.2
Justice Woodrough paid the 1936
tax under protest and then sued to recover the amount on the grounds that
18 Frick v. Pennsylvania (1905), 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603.
20 Graves v. Elliott (1939), 307 U. S. 383, 392, 59 S. Ct. 913, 917.
21 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905), 199 U. S. 194, 26
S. Ct. 36.
22 Lowndes, "The Passing of Situs" (1932), 45 Harvard L. R. 777.
147 Stat. 169, 178, 26 U. S. C. A. Sec. 22 (a), Federal Revenue Act of
1932, C. 209.
248 Stat. 680, 686, 687, 26 U. S. C. A. Sec. 22 (a), Federal Revenue Act
of 1934, c. 277. 49 Stat. 1648, 1657, 26 U. S. C. A. Sec. 22 (a) (Supp. 1936)
Federal Revenue Act of 1936, c. 690.
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the tax on the income of federal judges was a diminution of his salary in
violation of the United States Constitution. HELD: The statute is constitutional. O'Malley v. Woodrough (1939), 307 U. S. 277, 59 S. Ct. 838.
The provision of the United States Constitution which provides that the
judges shall receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in offices has deferred the income taxing
authorities from a fertile field of steady incomes ever since the Civil War
4
In an attempt
when the income tax first came into vogue in this country.
to find a loophole, the government did get the Supreme Court to limit the
application of the prohibition against diminution to judges of a constitutional
5
When the Sixteenth Amendment
as distinguished from a legislative court.
was interpreted, another gleam of hope died: the court found that the clause
6
It is
"from whatever source derived" added nothing to the power to tax.
significant, therefore, that the present case marks a definite change in the
law and is a victory for the taxing authorities.
The prevailing opinion has been that the provision against diminution
was inserted in the Constitution to guarantee the independence of the judiciary
7
This independence doctrine and the
from the influence of the legislature.
growth of the dogma that the power to tax involves the power to destroy
caused the courts and early writers to believe that a tax on the judges'
salaries would be disastrous.
But if a non-discriminatory income tax were imposed on everyone in the
United States, it is difficult to believe, that Congress would be able to raise
that tax simply to weaken the power of the judiciary. An easier way to
affect the financial stauding of the judges would be for Congress to fail to
8
make sufficient appropriation for the payment of their salaries.
But the issue here is not as to the constitutionality of a reduction of the
salary. It is whether or not an income tax on this salary is a reduction
3 U. S. Const. Art. III, Sec. 1.
4 Federal Revenue Act of 1862, c. 119, 12 Stat. 472, Sec. 86. See the
present case, Mr. Justice Butler dissenting, 307 U. S. 277, 283, 59 S. Ct. 838,
840; Evans v. Gore (1920), 253 U. S. 245, 40 S. Ct. 550; Miles v. Graham
(1925), 268 U. S. 501, 45 S. Ct. 601; Booth v. U. S., (1934), 291 U. S. 339,
54 S. Ct. 379.
5 Williams v. U. S. (1933), 289 U. S. 553, 53 S. Ct. 751, held that the
Court of Claims is not a constitutional but is a legislative court and thus
the diminution provision does not apply. Compare O'Donoghue v. U. S. (1933),
289 U. S. 516, 53 S. Ct. 740, holding that the District Court of Washington, D. C.
is a constitutional court and thus that the salary of the judges is not taxable.
See 9 Ind. L. JI. 318, (1934).
6Brushaber v. Union P. Ry. Co. (1915), 240 U. S. 1, 36 S. Ct. 236. See
Lowndes, "Spurious Conceptions of The Constitutional Law of Taxation,"
47 Harv. L. Rev. 628, 646, (1934).
7 "In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence
amounts to a power over his will-," Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist,
No. 79. For a review of historical statements see Mr. Justice Butler's dissenting
opinion in the present case, 307 U. S. 277, 283, 59 S. Ct. 838, 840.
sRiley v. Carter (1933), .165 Okla. 262, 25 P. (2nd) 666, 88 A. L. R.
1018, 22 Geo. L. JI. 376, (1934), held that a constitutional provision as to
no increase or decrease in judges salaries to be self-executing when the
legislature cut the appropriation. For analogy see Carr v. Ind. (1891),
127 Ind. 204, 26 N. E. 778. These cases are peculiar and present a minority
view.

RECENT CASE NOTES
of the salary at all. It has always been accepted that a property tax is
not a diminution of ones income. 9 Although the income tax is closer to the
salary in that one can see more clearly that the amount of the tax is related
to the salary received, logically the imposition is no more a diminution of
the income than are the other taxes and expenses that one has to pay. The
fact that taxes appear on the expense side of the accountants' books aids
in illuminating the point that taxes are expenses and not a deduction from
income. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, which, in the face of such a
formidable dissent as Mr. Justice Butler wrote, appears to be little more than
a summary, states: "To subject them (judges) to a general tax is merely to
recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular function in
government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow
citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws
they are charged with administering."' 0
The decision itself is rather narrow since the tax was already in effect
when Justice Woodrough took office; thus it might be said there was no
reduction when the tax was levied. But the opinion indicates that the court
considered the time element of little importance.1
Since the tax is treated
not as a reduction of salary but as an expense of living, the imposition on
all judges regardless of the time they took office would not be in violation of
the Constitutional provision against diminution.
The present decision perhaps will have more effect than merely to swell
the coffers of the federal treasury with money from people who presumably
are able to pay. In many of the state constitutions, including that of Indiana, 1 2
9 Willis, Constitutional Law (1936), p. 379. Note also that the Court
has held that a tax on income derived from exports was not a violation
of U. S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 9, Cl. 5, which provides that "No tax or duty
shall be laid on articles exported from any state"
The Court stated, "It
is not laid on income from exportation because of its source, or in a discriminative way, but just as it is laid on other income." Peck & Co. v. Lowe (1917),
247 U. S. 165, 38 S. Ct. 432.
10 307 U. S. 277, 282, 59 S. Ct. 838, 840. It seems that Mr. Justice Frankfurter could have made a more convincing argument in his opinion had
he elaborated more to show the exact principles involved. For a short but
clear statement of reasoning, see Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Evans
v. Gore (1920), 253 U. S. 245, 264-, 40 S. Ct. 550, 557.
11 It is evident from the statute that Congress intended the court to treat
the act to be an amendment of the salaries of those taking office after June 6,
1932: ". . . and all Acts fixing the compensation of such . . . judges are
hereby amended accordingly." Supra, note 1. In Evans v. Gore (1920),
253 U. S. 245, 40 S. Ct. 550, the act of 1918 Was held unconstitutional in
its application to judges already in office. In Miles v. Graham (1925), 268
U. S. 501, 45 S. Ct. 601, the same act of 1918 was held unconstitutional in
its application to judges taking office after the act became effective. In order
to uphold the statute in the present case, the court specifically overruled Miles
v. Graham and impliedly overruled Evans v. Gore. While the present case
was pending, Congress, by Section 3 of the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939,
amended Section 22 (a) so as to make it applicable to "Judges of courts of
the United States who took office on or before June 6, 1932." It is interesting
to note that the Justices of the United States Supreme Court for many years
have voluntarily paid the tax. Phillips, American Government and Its
Problems (1937), p. 627.
12 Ind. Const. Art. VII, Sec. 13, "The Judges of the Supreme Court and
Circuit Courts shall, at stated times, receive a.compensation which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office."
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there are similar provisions which require the salaries of various officials
not to be diminished during their continuance in office. The point has not
been ruled on in very many states and different conclusions have been reached
where the issue has been raised. 1 3 The Indiana Gross Income Tax has been
applied to state judges the same as to any other person and no controversy
appears to have arisen.1 4 With the present case to serve as a guide, the
states may ultimately decide uniformly that although the salaries cannot be
reduced, nevertheless, the judges should be held to share in the expense of
maintaining organized government.
When considered with the recent holding of the Supreme Court of the
United States that the states may tax federal employees,' 5 the present case
appears to permit the states as well as the federal government to tax the
incomes of the federal judges domiciled within their boundaries. Such a
result would place the officials on an equal basis with the rest of the taxpayers.
In spite of the fact that the advantages a judgeship offers would be
lessened so one might argue that the more desirable men would be drawn
into lucrative positions in private business, it is submitted that the present
case is a step in the right direction both in respect of enlarging the tax base
of the federal and state units and of shifting some of the burden to those
citizens who are evidently as vitally interested ia the welfare of these governments as any of the rest of the taxpayers.16
L. N. M.
13 See Fellman, D., "The diminution of the Judges Salaries," 24 Iowa L.
Rev. 89 (1938), for a comprehensive- review of the cases of the states as
well as of the English Countries. See also Hon. James Quarles, "Tax-exempt
Judicial Salaries: Passing of Evans v. Gore Cause for satisfaction," 25
A. B. A. J1. 832 (Oct., 1939).
14 Ind. Acts 1933, c. 50, Sec. 3, Burns Ind. Stat. 1933, Sec. 64-2603 (f);
Ind. Acts 1937, c. 117, Sec. 3 (f), Burns Ind. Stat. 1939 Supp., Sec. 64-2603 (f).
See Ind. Gross Income Tax Regulation 1937, Sec. 3420.
15 Graves v. N. Y. ex rel. O'Keefe (1939), 306 U. S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595,
14 Ind. L. J1. 461 (1939).
See: Ind. Acts 1933, c. 50, Sec. 6, Burns Ind.
Stat. 1933, Sec. 64-2606 (a); Ind. Acts 1937, c. 117, Sec. 6, Burns Ind. Stat.
1939 Supp., Sec. 64-2606 (a); Ind. Gross Income Tax Regulation 1937, Secs.
1615, 3419.
16 Amid wide acclaim and applause for the decision, the President of the
American Bar Association remains an advocate for the former view of the
court. Hon. Frank J. Hogan, "Important Shifts in Constitutional Doctrines,"
25 A. B. A. J1. 629 (August, 1939).

